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LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS FOR REAL PROPERTY:




T EXAS has a number of statutes of limitation affecting actions to
recover land. Among them is what may be referred to as the five-
year statute.1 In its present form the statute reads as follows:
Every suit to recover real estate as against a person having peaceable
and adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying the same,
and paying taxes thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed or deeds
duly registered, shall be instituted within five years next after cause
of action shall have accrued, and not afterward. This article shall not
apply to one in possession of land, who deraigns title through a forged
deed. And no one claiming under a forged deed, or deed executed under
a forged power of attorney shall be allowed the benefits of this article.
When the Republic enacted legislation in 1841 limiting the times
within which different types of actions to recover land might be
brought, a five-year statute very similar to the present statute was
included.2 In 1879 a statute substantially in the present form was
enacted.' The wording in the official revisions of the Texas Civil
Statutes in 1879, 1895, 1911, and 1925 has remained the same with
minor variations. Thus, it may be said that the decisions considering
the five-year statute through the years have been concerned with
language that presumably has been constant in meaning.
Practically all states have general statutes of limitation allowing
ownership of land to pass by virtue of peaceable and adverse possession
alone. The required period of possession is usually between seven and
twenty years; the Texas ten-year statute falls into this category."
*B.S., J.D., University of Washington; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University. Acknowledgment is made of a generous grant from
the Southwestern Legal Foundation under which a study of the Texas statutes of limitation
affecting real property is being carried on.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5509 (1958).
2Texas Acts 1841, An Act of Limitations, § 16, 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas 627 (1898)
declared: "Be it further enacted, That he, she or they, who shall have had five years like
peaceable possession of real state, cultivating, using or enjoying the same and paying tax
thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed, or deeds, duly registered, shall be held to have
full title, precluding all claims .... "
3Texas Acts 1879, ch. CXXV, 8 Gammel, Laws of Texas 1432 (1898).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5510 (1958). Other Texas statutes affecting actions to
recover land are Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 5507 (1958) (three years' possession) and
5518-5519 (1958) (twenty-five years' possession).
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These statutes strike a balance between the interest of an adverse
occupier to have his title and possession quieted and the interest of
the "true" owner to have a fair opportunity to recover the land
which belongs to him.' In many cases-perhaps most-it is accurate
to say that the statute rewards an occupier not for his ethical merit
but because of the "true" owner's neglect to take effective action to
protect his interests. Society demands that after a person has acted
as owner and possessor of property for a substantial time, he should
be recognized as such and thereafter should not be disturbed.
The Texas five year limitation statute, sometimes referred to as a
"short limitation statute," is a more unusual piece of legislation; prob-
ably not more than eight to ten other states have legislation similar
to it." It has been suggested that the length of time required by a
statute of limitation should be inversely proportional to the weak-
ness of the occupier's title.' Consistent with this idea, short limita-
tion statutes set out requirements in addition to peaceable and adverse
possession. Meeting these additional requirements will improve the
occupier's standing as a possessor and thus may increase the possibility
of his becoming the "true" owner. Perhaps more important, com-
pliance with these requirements gives to the world additional, pre-
cise notice of the occupier's claim.
The Texas five-year statute may be broken down into the follow-
ing elements: (1) peaceable and adverse possession of land, (2) claim
under a deed or deeds, (3) registration (recordation) of the deed
or deeds, and (4) payment of taxes on the land. A suit to recover
land clearly is barred by the statute only after these elements have
coexisted continuously for a period of five years.8 The expression,
"having peaceable and adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or
enjoying the same," is found in the ten and twenty-five year statutes'
as well as in the five-year statute. The three-year statute" uses the
simple expression, "in peaceable and adverse possession thereof."
'For discussions of the history and policy of limitation legislation, see 3 American Law
of Property §§ 15.1, 15.2 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 1132-34 (3d ed.
1939).
aSee Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 551, S16-57, 738
(1935).
'Cunningham v. Frandtzen, 26 Tex. 34, 40 (1861).
'Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W.2d 226 (1938); Sorley
v. Matlock, 79 Tex. 304, 15 S.W. 261 (1891); Snowden v. Rush, 76 Tex. 197, 13 S.W.
189 (1890); Winters v. Laird, 27 Tex. 616 (1864); Mitchell v. Burdett, 22 Tex. 635
(1858); Griswold v. Comer, 209 S.W. 139 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Jackson v. Heath,
325 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 5510, 5518 (1958) (proviso). Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5519 (1958) (also a twenty-five year statute) uses only the expression, "having
peaceable and adverse possession."
"
0 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5507 (1958).
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Other statutes define "peaceable possession" and "adverse posses-
sion."11 Undoubtedly the concept of "peaceable and adverse posses-
sion" is the same in the various statutes. Hundreds of decisions have
explored the concept and elaborated upon its meaning. Therefore,
this Article will not deal with "peaceable and adverse possession."
Rather, the topics for examination will be elements two through
four, listed above. Consideration will be given to the elements which
must exist in order for an occupier to establish ownershipunder the
five-year statute, assuming that he has entered and possessed land
in a manner which amounts to "peaceable and adverse possession,
cultivating, using or enjoying the same."
II. CLAIM UNDER A DEED OR DEEDS
A. Does The Instrument Operate As A Deed?
The statute declares that the occupier must claim "under a deed
or deeds." For purposes of the statute, a deed is an instrument which
purports to convey land from a named grantor to a named grantee."
A bond for title" or contract for sale is not such an instrument. "
In Massie v. Meeks" a defendant who claimed title under an absolute
deed to a prior party that was known by him to have been given as
a mortgage could not set up the five-year statute as a defense. The
statute contemplates a claim by an adverse possessor under a deed or
deeds which purport to grant an interest that is immediate, beneficial,
and possessory. It is immaterial under the statute that a deed in fact
conveys nothing because the grantor owns nothing."t The only re-
quirements are that the instrument must be genuine and must pur-
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 5514 (peaceable possession) and 5515 (adverse pos-
session) (1958).
"Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Albright, 126 Tex. 485, 87 S.W.2d 1092 (1935); Rose-
borough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 194 S.W. 131 (1917); Davis v. Morley, 169 S.W.2d 561
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Merriman v. Blalock, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 122 S.W. 403 (1909)
error ref.; Yarborough v. Whitman, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 110 S.W. 471 (1908).
"A bond for title is a contract to convey which may ripen into an equitable title upon
payment of the consideration named in the bond; it is not a conveyance of legal title.
Faddell v. Taylor, 239 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922). The purpose of the now
obsolete bond for title is fulfilled essentially by the contemporary contract for the sale of
land.
4 Winters v. Laird, 27 Tex. 616, 619 (1864) ("We think . . . the act of limitations
contemplates an unconditional deed."); Castro v. Wurzbach, 13 Tex. 128 (1854); Wille
v. Ellis, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 54 S.W. 922 (1900).
528 S.W. 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) error ref.
"Roseborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 194 S.W. 131 (1917); Benskin v. Barksdale,
246 S.W. 360 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Hunton v. Nichols, 55 Tex. 217 (1881); Mont-
gomery v. Heath, 283 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd in Part on other grounds,
291 S.W. 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); Village Mills Co. v. Houston Oil Co., 186 S.W.
785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), rev'd on other grounds, 241 S.W. 122 (Tex. Comm. App.
1922); Horton v. Halff, 147 S.W. 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (junior patent).
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port to convey an adequately described tract of land. A married
woman,'" an administrator of an estate,18 or a sheriff"' may not have
capacity, authority, or title to convey, respectively. Nevertheless,
their deeds are sufficient under the five-year statute if they do not
show nullity on their faces.
Frequently an adverse possessor offers a tax deed as a basis for
his claim, and this type of instrument has been accepted as fulfilling
the requirement of the five-year statute." However, the statute does
not begin to run until two years after the tax deed was executed
because the land conveyed thereby is subject to redemption during
that period by the taxpayer.2' Davis v. Hurst was the first decision
on the point, and therein the Texas Supreme Court said:
"While the tax-deed to Franklin could not be used as a muniment
of title or as a basis for possession under the five-year statute of limita-
tions until the period for redemption had expired, still it would be
such deed after the expiration of the time, and, if duly registered while
in abeyance, the registration would be good after it ripened into an
absolute deed by lapse of time. It would not be necessary to record it
again after the time of redemption had expired to constitute it a deed
duly registered." 2
In Beatty v. O'Harrow the court offered a brief explanation why
the statute does not begin to run until two years have elapsed after
the tax deed has been executed: "During this period the possession
of the purchaser is much like that of a mortgagee in possession. It is
7Fry v. Baker, 59 Tex. 404 (1883) (no joinder by husband, but deed did not disclose
her coverture). In Harris v. Wells, 85 Tex. 312, 20 S.W. 68 (1892), a deed executed by
a husband was held sufficient which did not show on its face that the land was the separate
property of his wife. Accord, Dupuy v. Dicks, 218 S.W. 49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error
ref.; State Nat'l Bank v. Roberts, 103 S.W. 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
Is Halbert v. Martin, 30 S.W. 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
"9Patrick v. Simpson, 168 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; Hufstedler
v. Sides, 165 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.; Holt v. Holt, 59 S.W.2d
324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref.
" Davis v. Hurst, 14 S.W. 610 (Tex. 1890); Davis v. Howe, 213 S.W. 609 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1919); Bavousett v. Bradshaw, 332 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
error ref. n.r.e.; City of Houston v. Darland, 264 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
error ref. n.r.e.; Pounds v. Richardson, 248 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Lindley
v. Mowell, 232 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; Griswold v. Comer,
161 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), modified on other grounds, 209 S.W. 139 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1919) Bledsoe v. Haney, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 285, 122 S.W. 455 (1909);
Beatty v. O'Harrow, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 404, 109 S.W. 414 (1908) error ref.; Gillaspie
v. Murray, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 580, 66 S.W. 252 (1902); Smith v. Kenney, 54 S.W. 801
(Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
"' Davis v. Hurst, City of Houston v. Darland, Pounds v. Richardson, Lindley v.
Mowell, Bledsoe v. Haney, Beatty v. O'Harrow, all cited note 20 supra. In the Lindley
case this rule was held to operate in favor of a stranger to the tax suit in whom no right
of redemption rested.
22 14 S.W. 610, 610-11 (Tex. 1890).
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subject, rather than adverse, to the right of the owner to repossess
himself at any time by a redemption.""
A deed executed in fraud of creditors qualifies as a sufficient deed
under the five-year statute. The statute begins to run immediately
against a creditor of the grantor who has reduced his lien to judg-
ment and perhaps also against one who has a matured claim. 4 After
the statute has run, the creditor can neither set aside the deed nor
levy directly on the land." Also, a suit by a creditor to cancel a deed
executed in fraud of creditors may be barred by the four-year
statute governing the bringing of personal actions; but this statute
is not a real barrier because a creditor may proceed directly to fix a
judgment lien upon the land.2"
A deed procured by the fraud of a grantee undoubtedly qualifies
as a sufficient deed under the five-year statute as against persons
unconnected with the grantor. But as against the grantor special
considerations either may postpone or may prevent the operation
of the statute to an extent not fully known at present. Deaton v.
Rush"7 established that if a deed is procured by fraud, the grantor
cannot sue to recover the land until after he has obtained a decree
cancelling the deed. Consequently, the cause of action to recover the
land does not accrue until after the deed is cancelled, and therefore
the statutes of limitation pertaining to realty do not begin to run
until the date of cancellation. Incidental relief for recovery of land
may be sought in a suit for cancellation of a deed,"s thereby prevent-
ing the statutes of limitation from beginning to run as of the date
of cancellation. If judgment for only cancellation is had, at least the
ten-year statute' will begin on run from that time, and the defendant
2a49 Tex. Civ. App. 404, 406, 109 S.W. 414, 415 (1908) error ref.
2Hartman v. Hartman, 135 Tex. 596, 138 S.W.2d 802 (1940); Eckert v. Wendel,
120 Tex. 618, 40 S.W.2d 796 (1931), noted in 10 Texas L. Rev. 371 (1932); White v.
Pingenot, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 641, 90 S.W. 672 (1905) error ref.; Stern v. Marx, 23 Tex.
Civ. App. 206, 56 S.W. 93 (1900) error ref.
25Cates v. Clark, 24 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
2"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 5529 (1958). The four-year limitation barring suit
for cancellation of a deed does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered or should
have been discovered through the exercise of ordinary care. Cartwright v. Minton, 318
S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
A direct levy upon the land by a creditor is allowed because a conveyance in fraud of
creditors is null and void as to them, both legal and equitable title remaining in the debtor
for the purpose of satisfying debts. Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, - Tex. -, 381 S.W.2d 48,
54-55 (1964); Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 40 S.W.2d 796 (1931).
27 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W. 1025 (1923), discussed at length in Larson, Texas Limita-
tions: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177, 183-85 (1961); accord, Walling
v. Rose, 2 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
28 Lott v. Van Zandt, 107 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); McCampbell v. Durst,
15 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 40 S.W. 315 (1897) error dism. w.o.j.
29 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5510 (1958).
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thereafter may acquire ownership by peaceable and adverse possession
under this statute. There is some doubt whether the five year statute
will run because the question of whether a deed cancelled by judicial
process qualifies as a deed under the five-year statute presently is
unanswered. 0 Of course, the four-year statute"' barring suit for can-
cellation of a deed may run, in which event the deed is no longer
subject to avoidance and no suit for recovery of the land ever can
be brought."s
Ordinarily, an occupier under the five-year statute is named as
grantee in the last deed under which he claims. But a few cases have
arisen in which an occupier has claimed under a deed taken in the
name of a third party. In these cases the assertion of the five-year
statute has been allowed."a One may question, however, whether the
policy of notice is served if an occupier is permitted to claim under
a deed with which he apparently has no connection.
A Texas statute provides expressly for the tacking of peaceable
and adverse possession.' Privity of estate must exist between the
successive occupiers; i.e., an intentional transfer of rights between
these parties must occur. The language of the five-year statute
("claiming under deed or deeds") indicates that the legislature con-
templated that successive periods of peaceable and adverse possession
could be tacked, and Texas courts have so held without special
comment in many cases. The language also indicates that if one
occupier takes over what another occupier had, generally privity of
estate must be achieved by deed. An exception arises if an adverse
possessor claims as an heir or devisee of another. It is accepted that
an occupier without a deed may claim under the five-year statute
through an ancestor or testator who had a sufficient deed. 5
A deed void on its face does not satisfy the five-year statute." But
'0 However, see note 50 infra.
3 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5529 (1958).
2 See note 26 supra.
•s
5Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917) (deed to agent);
Thompson v. Weisman, 98 Tex. 170, 82 S.W. 503 (1904); Kirby v. Hayden, 44 Tex. Civ.
App. 207, 99 S.W. 746 (1906), on second appeal, 125 S.W. 993 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910),
aff'd sub nom. Houston Oil Co. v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 135 S.W. 1149 (1911) (deed
to third party as security for purchase price).
"' "Peaceable and adverse possession need not be continued in the same person, but when
held by different persons successively there must be a privity of estate between them." Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5516 (1958).
55 Fossett v. McMahan, 74 Tex. 546, 12 S.W. 324 (1889); Slattery v. Adams, 279
S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd, 156 Tex. 433, 295 S.W.2d 859 (1956); McLavy
v. Jones, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 354, 72 S.W. 407 (1903) error ref.
56 Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270, 20 S.W. 120 (1892) (tax deed); Wofford v.
McKinna, 23 Tex. 36 (1859) (tax deed); Taylor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 295 S.W.2d
738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e. (sheriff's sale).
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if a deed is void only because of facts and circumstances (other than
forgery) extrinsic to its face, it will be an entirely adequate instru-
ment. This conclusion is derived from a considerable number of cases
in which an occupier has gained ownership of land under the statute
through a deed that conveyed nothing. The most common ground
for asserting that a deed is void on its face is insufficiency of or error
in the description of the land conveyed thereby. This challenge has
been sustained in a number of cases."7 In order to be valid in this
respect, a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description from
which the land conveyed can be located and the boundaries thereof
fixed with certainty. The requirement of a claim "under a deed or
deeds" is coupled immediately in the statute with the requirement of
registration. Obviously, judicial insistence on a deed which sufficiently
describes the land also is intended to complement the registration
requirement, whose purpose is to afford precise and full notice to the
world of exactly what the adverse possessor claims. Recordation of a
deed containing an insufficient description of the land conveyed
hardly perfects the requisite degree of notice contemplated in the
statute. But frequently techniques of construction are utilized to
make a description definite and certain,"' and parol evidence is ad-
missible to give meaning to terms and expressions used in a deed."
Mistakes are ignored or explained away if enough remains to con-
stitute a definite and certain description.4'
Forgery nullifies a deed for the purposes of the statute. One can-
not rely upon the statute if he "deraigns title through a forged deed"
or through a deed "executed under a forged power of attorney."'
But misrepresentation in a deed as to what a grantor owns or as to
his relationship to a former owner does not constitute forgery." In
Olsen v. Grelle" defendants traced their title from a deed which
had been executed under a forged power of attorney; but they had
been in possession six or seven years under later genuine, recorded
deeds. When the suit was brought, the exception in the statute con-
" Murphy v. Welder, 58 Tex. 235 (1883 ) ; Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113 (1859) ;
Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36 (1859); Morgan v. Darlington, 192 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946); Clark v. Kirby, 25 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
3Flanagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex. 330 (1876); Brownfield v. Brabson, 231 S.W. 491 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921); Langham v. Gray, 227 S.W. 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
aNoland v. Weems, 141 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) error ref.
40 Udell v. Peak, 70 Tex. 547, 7 S.W. 786 (1888); Eastham v. Gibbs, 58 Tex. Civ.
App. 627, 125 S.W. 372 (1910); Moore v. Loggins, 114 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
.4'Logan v. Robertson, 83 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904), rev'd on other grounds
sub noam. Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 86 S.W. 746 (1905).
4'Fogle v. Baker, 205 S.W. 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), rev'd on other grounds, 110
Tex. 301, 217 S.W. 141 (1919).
4'228 S.W. 927 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
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cerning forgery was worded as a proviso "that this article shall not
apply to any one ... who in the absence of this article would deraign
title through a forged deed."" It was held that defendants could not
use the five-year statute of limitations as a defense. The court stated
that the proviso made the five-year statute inapplicable "where in-
voked to perfect a title, regular on its face, but tainted with forg-
ery."4 Adams v. Thompson" was litigated after the most recent re-
vision in 1925 of the Texas Civil Statutes, in which the clause, "who
in the absence of this article," was omitted in the five-year statute.
The question before the court was the same as in the Olsen case. The
court again rejected the argument that one who claims land under
a deed in a chain of title which contains a forged deed may acquire
ownership by holding the land for five years under a deed or deeds
executed and recorded after the forgery: "The language of the
proviso as it now reads is too plain and broad to warrant the con-
struction limiting its application as contended by appellants."4
It is clear that one holding under a recorded deed which is un-
connected with the true claim of title can acquire ownership under
the five-year statute." Therefore, it seems odd that such ownership
cannot be acquired if the deed connects with the true claim through
a forgery antedating the five years of peaceable and adverse posses-
sion. The notice given to the world is the same in both cases. Appar-
ently the policy of the statute, as interpreted by the judiciary, is that
forgery is a sufficiently serious wrong to vitiate any deed connected
therewith in any way.
A deed is rendered a nullity under the statute if the grantee con-
veys his interest in the land or has his title thereto divested before
he occupies the land under the deed.4' The same is true if an occupier
tacks his possession to that of a predecessor who conveyed his interest
in the land by an earlier deed."° One cannot quarrel with the proposi-
tion that deeds should not qualify under the five-year statute if the
grantees therein render them nugatory by their own acts.
"Former art. 5674, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1911). (Emphasis added.)
"Olsen v. Grelle, 228 S.W. 927, 928.4'95 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.; accord, Hindsman v. Willis, 125
S.W.2d 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judgm. cor.; see Comment, 9 Baylor L.
Rev. 338, 344 (1957).
" Adams v. Thompson, 95 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.
48 See text accompanying and following note 33 supra.
4"Smith v. Bunch, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 541, 73 S.W. 559 (1903) error ref.
"°Weatherred v. Kiker, 357 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.; Shaw
v. Thompson Bros. Lumber Co., 177 S.W. 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). Perhaps these de-
cisions and Smith v. Bunch, supra note 49, answer the question previously raised (see text




One may speculate whether a deed which never has been delivered
to the grantee satisfies the five-year statute, a question to which a
Texas court has not addressed itself yet. However, it has been indi-
cated that if delivery out of escrow has been made by reason of
mistake or wrongdoing, the deed nevertheless will be sufficient under
the statute. 1 If the grantor assents to the delivery out of escrow,
the situation will be similar to that in Deaton v. Rush," which estab-
lished that a grantor must sue for cancellation of a deed procured by
fraud before bringing an action to recover the land. Suit for re-
covery of the land apparently would have to be deferred until the
deed were set aside, at which time at least the ten-year statute would
begin to run-the operation of the five-year statute in this situation
is uncertain because it is not known whether a deed cancelled by
judicial process constitutes a "deed or deeds" within the meaning of
the statute.
B. Extent Of Interest That Can Be Claimed
It is fundamental that an occupier under the five-year statute
gains ownership of only the land described in the deed or deeds under
which he claims." The tax deed cases discussed earlier exemplify this
principle. 4 Sometimes an occupier holds under a deed or deeds which
convey only an undivided fractional interest in a tract of land,,
only the surface of the land, or only the minerals underneath. In
these instances the occupier merely gains ownership under the five-
year statute of the interest described in the deeds."
A related matter is the extent of the interest that can be claimed
by an adverse possessor who occupies under a quitclaim deed. A
quitclaim deed conveys "all rights, title and interest" which a
grantor has in land, or the granting clause therein may "remise,
release and forever quitclaim" a described tract of land. Regardless
"Neal v. Pickett, 280 S.W. 748 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
'2 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W. 1025 (1923); see note 27 supra and accompany text.
'a"Limitation under . . . [the] statute is available only when the party asserting it
claims under a deed purporting to convey the property." Cass v. Green, 224 S.W. 938,
939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). See also Moore v. McDonald, 298 S.W. 662 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) error dism.
" See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
"5 Club Land & Cattle Co. v. Wall, 99 Tex. 591, 92 S.W. 984 (1906); Smoot v. Woods,
363 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Co.,
131 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judgm. cor.; Dowdell v. McCardell,
193 S.W. 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Yarborough v. Whitman, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 391,
110"S.W. 471 (1908).
In order to comply with the requirement of payment of taxes under the five-year statute,
it is sufficient that the occupier pays taxes proportionate to the extent of his claim. Club
Land & Cattle Co. v. Wall, supra; Dowdell v. McCardell, supra. For a discussion of the




of the form of language used, the effect of a quitclaim deed is to
transfer whatever interest the grantor has with no covenant or
representation by him that any particular estate or title is conveyed.
Can an occupier who holds under a quitclaim deed assert any greater
title under the five-year statute than that which his grantor had?
One might deduce a negative answer from the broad principle that
no interest can be claimed in excess of that which the deed purports
to grant, but the decisions have established a contrary rule. An
occupier can assert a fee simple title under the statute even though
his deed is a quitclaim and actually conveyed nothing." In Parker
v. Newberry the Texas Supreme Court explained this result as fol-
lows:
Recurring to the first mentioned [question], we think that the rule
that a purchaser, who takes only such interest as is conveyed by a
quitclaim deed technically, cannot, under that character of convey-
ance, be protected as a purchaser in good faith, etc., has no application
where such deed is made the basis of the five-years plea of limitation.
Notice, good faith, and the payment of a valuable consideration are im-
portant elements, and may become vital, in a controversy where title
is asserted under a quitclaim deed between parties deraigning their
rights from a common vendor. They cannot be relied on to support
limitation, and form none of the elements of that plea. The character
of the instrument would be unimportant if it be valid . . . as a con-
veyance, and belongs to that class of written instruments. The essential
requisites of a deed necessary as the foundation of the plea are that it
shall by its own terms, or with such aids as the law authorizes, assume
or purport to operate as a conveyance. . . . It is not necessary that it
should emanate from one proving title, or that it shall convey the
title. . . . The instrument in this case . . . has all of the constituent
parts of a complete deed.57
In further explanation of the requirement of a deed, the court said
the following in another decision:
The law of limitation of actions for land is founded upon notice. The
title by limitation ripens, primarily, only because, in such manner and
for such period of time as the different statutes require, notice is given
of the hostile claim. Under the three years statute, it is afforded by
possession under title or color of title. Under the ten years statute,
simply by possession. And under the five years statute, it is given by
possession, the payment of taxes, and the registration of a naked deed.
"Parker v. Newberry, 83 Tex. 428, 18 S.W. 815 (1892); McDonough v. Jefferson
County, 79 Tex. 535, 15 S.W. 490 (1891); Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1923); Porter v. Wilson, 371 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Merriman
v. Blalack, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 121 S.W. 552 (1909) error ref. Contra, Jackson v.
Heath, 325 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See Comment, 9 Baylor L. Rev. 338,
341-44 (1957).
5'83 Tex. 428, 430, 18 S.W. 815, 816 (1892).
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It is not the character of the deed as a conveyance of title which, under
the five years statute, helps to put limitation in motion. It assists the
operation of limitation under that statute merely because of the notice
given of the adverse claim by its registration as an instrument which
purports to convey, not the title, but the land." (Emphasis added.)
One may approve wholeheartedly the decisions holding that a
quitclaim deed is sufficient under the five-year statute to support a
claim for full title. The deed effectuates the parties' intent in the
common situation in which the parties desire that a full title should
pass but are content to relieve the grantor of any obligation if it
later becomes apparent that his title was defective. Persons inspecting
a registered quitclaim deed understand its nature, and it is not unfair
to hold them to notice that the grantee is asserting a full title.
To be distinguished from the quitclaim deed is a deed which is
limited specifically to conveying only the interest which the grantor
actually either owns or has acquired as an heir. In this situation an
occupier has not been allowed to claim an interest greater than that
which is described and limited expressly in the deed under which he
claims." It is a matter of construction whether an instrument is a
quitclaim deed intended to convey the grantor's entire interest in
land or is a conveyance of a particular right or interest specifically
contemplated by the parties.
The doctrine of constructive possession operates under the five-
year statute in the usual way. The owner has constructive possession
of all of his unoccupied lands until an adverse possessor enters. After
entry, the adverse possessor acquires constructive possession of all
unoccupied lands described in his deed, and the statute runs as to all
of such lands." An owner of land may prevent an adverse occupier
from acquiring constructive possession of unoccupied land by enter-
ing and occupying a portion of land described in the deed. After the
owner of the land leaves, it will be necessary for the adverse claimant
to enter and to occupy an additional portion of the land described
in order to establish constructive possession to the limits of his deed."
The entry and occupation of additional land gives notice of a claim
made under a registered deed that may include unoccupied lands.
"'Roseborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 194 S.W. 131, 132 (1917).
"Livingston v. McMullen Oil & Realty Co., 289 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error dism. (conveyance of minerals "which may actually be owned by . . . grantor at this
time"); Lawrence v. Barrow, 117 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ("all my right, title
and interest that I own as an heir of Amos Barrow, deceased").
"'Allison v. California Petroleum Corp. of Venezuela, 158 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Co., 131 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) error dism., judgm. cot.




Constructive possession by an occupier does not extend to unoccupied
lands owned by someone having no connection with the owner of
the occupied portion." However, an adverse occupier can acquire
ownership of two separately owned tracts under one deed, but to do
so he must enter both lands and must maintain five years' peaceable
and adverse possession of portions of both tracts.
III. DUE REGISTRATION OF DEEDS
To qualify under the five-year statute, an occupier must claim
under a deed or deeds "duly registered." Due registration means
recordation of a deed which fulfills the requirements therefor. The
purpose of the requirement of recordation is to supply public notice
of the occupier's claim to the "true" owner and to the world."
Recordation also gives rise to a presumption that the deed actually
was executed and delivered."' The five-year statute does not begin to
run until due registration has been accomplished, even though peace-
able and adverse possession has begun earlier." The statute will run
against an owner only after notice has been given to him through
both peaceable and adverse possession and proper recordation.
Successive grantees may possess land for a five-year period during
which it is claimed a limitation title has matured. It is possible to
argue that the statute requires only that the first deed must be regis-
tered and that the occupier must claim under it. This argument pre-
vailed in a few cases, 7 but the bulk of authority holds that all deeds
executed during the five-year period must be recorded." This rule
is supported by an analysis of the statutory language. The statute
mentions claiming under a "deed or deeds duly registered," and the
use of the plural alternative therein suggests that the legislative mind
was aware that two or more successive grantees might claim during
a five-year period. It is easy to infer that in the statute the legislature
intended to provide for continuity in recordation from grantee to
grantee.
62Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W.2d 226 (1938).
6 Jackson v. Heath, 325 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).64 Todd v. Hand, 225 S.W. 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref.
65Harvey v. Cummings, 68 Tex. 599, 5 S.W. 513 (1887); Brownfield v. Brabson, 231
S.W. 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Taylor v. Brymer, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 42 S.W. 999
(1897).
66See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
67 Ammerman v. Bourland, 230 S.W. 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Settegast v. Floyd,
214 S.W. 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); York v. Hutcheson, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 83
S.W. 895 (1904). Only the first deed need be registered under the twenty-five year statute,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5519 (1958). Free v. Owen, 131 Tex. 281, 113 S.W.2d 1221
(1938), discussed in Larson, supra note 27, at 193.
"6 Cases cited note 69 infra.
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The statute does not say how promptly successive deeds should
be recorded. Immediate recordation of the deeds is undoubtedly too
much to expect, and the courts have declared that recordation is
sufficient if effected within a reasonable time after the grantee re-
ceives his deed and goes into possession. 9 A few days or perhaps a
month is reasonable, but a year clearly is unreasonable. Various cir-
cumstances bear on whether or not a lapse of time is reasonable. In
Dunn v. Taylor the court said: "But there was proof explaining the
dates of the deeds. The time shown by the dates of the registration
by parties, their homes, and the surrounding circumstances all can
be considered by the jury .... What is a reasonable time may under
certain circumstances become a question of fact, and proper to be
submitted to a jury for its finding."7 If an unreasonable delay in
registration by a successive grantee has occurred, the statute will
stop running, and later the limitation period will start anew after
adverse possession again is coupled with a properly recorded deed. 1
Of course, recordation should be perfected in the county in which
the land lies. The recordation statute prescribes that all deeds and
conveyances of land "shall be recorded in the county where such real
estate, or a part thereof, is situated."72 In Slaughter v. Hight" the
question arose as to the county in which a deed conveying land in
two counties should be recorded in order to satisfy the five-year
statute. The court relied on the language of the recordation statute
and declared that recordation in either county would make the deed
"duly registered." Logic and policy support the holding. Peaceable
and adverse possession of part of a tract of land gives notice to the
owner that the occupier may be claiming all the tract. If the tract
extends into two counties, the owner will be on notice that the deed
may be recorded in either county.
An ordinary grantee of land has a considerable responsibility for
the proper recordation of his deed. If he is lax in this regard, he may
lose his property to a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice."4
" Daugherty v. Manning, 221 S.W. 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error dism. (five
months excessive); Dupuy v. Dicks, 218 S.W. 49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error rel. (eleven
months excessive); Snow v. Letcher, 154 S.W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (more than
year excessive); William Cameron & Co. v. Collier, 153 S.W. 1178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
error dism. (nine months excessive); Gillum v. Fuqua, 61 S.W. 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901);
Jack v. Dillon, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 192, 25 S.W. 645 (1894) error ref. (one month held rea-
sonable).
70 143 S.W. 311, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.), vacated on other grounds, 147 S.W. 287 (1912),
aff'd, 108 Tex. 337, 193 S.W. 663 (1917).
71 Cases cited note 69 supra.
7 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6630 (1960).
73239 S.W. 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
7 See generally 5 Tiffany, Real Property S 1273 (2d ed. 1939).
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However, he is not prejudiced by his laxity if the subsequent party
had notice or did not pay value. But unlike a grantee, an occupier
under the five-year statute apparently has an absolute responsibility
to record properly the deed or deeds under which he claims. No case
suggests that the requirement of registration is dispensed with or
eased if the owner is aware of the occupier's claim under a deed and
knows of the deed's contents. Solely by virtue of the statute, an un-
worthy occupier may gain a full title, and the presumed legislative
sentiment is that in order to do so he should satisfy fully the statutory
requirements.
Several types of technical defects in recording have prevented
deeds from satisfying the recordation requirement of the five-year
statute. In Carleton v. Lombardi"a a notary public took the acknowl-
edgement of "T. W. Chandler" on a deed executed by "F. W.
Chandler." There was evidence that the notary public made a mistake
in writing "T" for "F" and that the recording clerk undertook to
correct the recorded certificate. The court held that the defense of
limitation failed because "the deed was neither acknowledged nor
recorded properly."7 In Allison v. Baird Dev. Co.,7 ' the claimants
occupied land under a deed executed by "Mayer" but recorded as
executed by "Mayes." Although the error seemed to be immaterial
as far as public notice was concerned, the court on the authority of
the Carleton case held that the deed was not duly registered and
could not support limitation under the five-year statute. In Callen
v. Collins"' the record of the certificate of acknowledgment of a
deed was defective because it did not recite that the notary public
knew the grantor as the person whose name was subscribed to the
instrument. The court stated therein:
[T]he evidence fails to show title in Ivey under the 5 . .. year
statute of limitation .... As it appears upon the record, this deed was
not duly recorded, in that the certificate of acknowledgment, as shown
by the record, was fatally defective, and we do not think that the
fact that the deed was in truth properly acknowledged, and such ac-
knowledgment properly certified by the officer, cures the defect in the
record. The 5-year statute of limitation requires that the deed under
which title may be acquired by 5 years' adverse possession shall be
7 81 Tex. 355, 16 S.W. 1081 (1891).
70 The court stated, "The officer certified that T. W. Chandler was known to him, and
that it was he who made the acknowledgment. The certificate that he knew the party must
be held to include that he knew his name, and that he gave it correctly in the certificate.
Presumptions cannot be indulged contrary to the facts stated in the certificate. An acknowl-
edgment of a deed by a person named T. W. Chandler is not proof upon which one exe-
cuted by F. W. Chandler may be lawfully recorded." Id. at 358, 16 S.W. at 1081-82.
77292 S.W. 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
78 56 Tex. Civ. App. 620, 120 S.W. 546 (1909).
[Vol. 18
FIVE-YEAR LIMITATION STATUTE
duly recorded, and this .. .means not only that the deed must be
properly acknowledged and certified for record, but that the record
itself must show this fact."
A miscellany of other defects have prevented proper recordation.
Due registration of a deed is not effected if the certificate or acknowl-
edgment lacks a notarial seal.9' A certificate is inadequate if the agent
of two persons who execute a deed appears before the notary to make
the acknowledgment for them." Until the enactment of recent legis-
lation,"2 the omission of a material part of a privy acknowledgment
by a married woman made her deed void and unacceptable for rec-
ordation if the deed showed on its face that her separate property
was being conveyed." If the list of pitfalls seems long, the adverse
possessor should be cheered to know that the sufficiency of recorda-
tion is not affected if the records building burns down."
IV. PAYMENT OF TAXES
In order to qualify under the five-year statute an occupier of land
must pay "taxes thereon, if any." This requirement is stated in a
simple phrase, and the courts have had numerous occasions to elabo-
rate upon its meaning. The expression, "if any," plainly indicates that
if no taxes are imposed, the occupier will gain ownership by satisfying
the other requirements of the statute." The term "taxes" is not
qualified, and presumably all taxes assessed against the land must be
paid. State, county, city, and school district taxes certainly must be
paid." If the property already is on the tax rolls, "paying taxes" does
not include rendering the land (i.e., reporting under oath to the tax-
"Id. at 625, 120 S.W. at 549.
"McDonald v. Stanfield, 197 S.W. 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.
"Christy v. Romero, 140 S.W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) error ref.
"aVernon's Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 472, at 1189 (1963) (removing the disabilities of
coverture of a married woman regarding her contracts and her management and control of
her separate property). See generally Smith, Legislative Note: 1963 Amendments Affecting
Married Women's Rights in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 70 (1964).
SaWalker v. Knox, 191 S.W. 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., McBurney v. Knox, 111 Tex. 510, 241 S.W. 1000 (1922); Kimmey v. Abney, 107
S.W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
4Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336 (1879).
'"Holbert v. City of Amarillo, 294 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
"Wichita Valley Ry. v. Somerville, 179 S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). In Wixom
v. Bowers, 152 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m., it was assumed that
drainage district taxes should be paid.
In the Wichita Valley case the court said, " 'Paying the taxes thereon' is not met by
paying part of the taxes thereon. Taxes thereon included all the taxes. City taxes and school
taxes are taxes thereon, recognized by both the Constitution and laws of this state." 179
S.W. at 675. The court stated further, "If it is required for the purpose of additional notice,
each tax roll, whether state, county, city, or independent school district, must each show
the payment in order to give such notice; for each are [sic] required to be kept and the
payment on each is notice of an adverse claim." 179 S.W. at 676.
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing authorities that one owns certain property)." But perhaps render-
ing is required if the taxing authorities are unaware of the tract in
question."s If a tax assessor erroneously fails to assess a particular tax
on the land, it has been held that the claimant may satisfy the five-
year statute by paying all other taxes levied on the land during the
required period."s
Taxes must be paid on the land described in the deeds under which
the claim is made; tax payments on lands not described therein are
ineffective to perfect a claim under the statute." The claimant has
the responsibility for making his tax payments under a correct de-
scription of the land, and good intentions are no substitute therefor.'
In Dutton v. Thompson 2 the defendant claimed land in one section,
but rendered land in another section for the purpose of tax assess-
ment. The Texas Supreme Court stated:
Appellee's statement that he paid the taxes on the land for the years
enumerated, in view of his rendition, amounts to no more than an
expression of an intention to pay on the land, and this cannot override
the conceded fact that his rendition did not cover the land in contro-
versy, and the further fact that the tax roll was the collector's warrant
for demanding and receiving taxes. That payment must be held to
have been made under the assessment, in the absence of evidence other
than such as appears in the record.
It is not very clear why the legislature made the payment of taxes
necessary in order to sustain the defense of limitation based on the five
years' adverse possession under a recorded deed. It may have been . . .
to require evidence of good faith on the part of the occupant, to secure
to the state and its municipal subdivisions the payment of taxes due
on the land, or to give further notice of the adverse claim and of the
time it would mature into title, if possession be not interrupted, than
afforded even by adverse possession under a recorded deed. If the latter
be the reason, then there would be the strongest reasons for holding
that the assessment-a public instrument-should show that claim
to the particular land was thus made by the occupant or person for
whom he may hold. . .. "
87Cantagrel v. Von Lupin, 58 Tex. 570 (1883); Ammerman v. Bourland, 230 S.W.
804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
88Ledyard v. Brown, 27 Tex. 393 (1864). "The position . . . that if there were no
taxes assessed . . . , Ledyard was relieved from the necessity of proving the payment of
the taxes upon it to make good his title . . . , cannot be sustained. It is the duty of a party
claiming land, to render it to the officer whose duty it is to assess it." Id. at 405.
"8Wixom v. Bowers, 152 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.
"Conn v. Houston Oil Co., 218 S.W. 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Schiele v. Kimball,
150 S.W. 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error dism. w.o.j.; Frazer v. Seureau, 60 Tex. Civ.
App. 416, 128 S.W. 649 (1910) error dism.; Sharpe v. Kellogg, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 543,
116 S.W. 401 (1909).
" Brownfield v. Brabson, 231 S.W. 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
92 85 Tex. 115, 19 S.W. 1026 (1892).
931d. at 119, 19 S.W. at 1028.
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It has been stated that under the five-year statute taxes must be
paid on all the land described in the claimant's deed." This statement
is true if the issue is whether or not ownership of the entire tract
described in the deed has passed by limitation. But it would seem
possible for an adverse occupier to claim something less than the
entire tract and to comply with the statutory requirement by paying
taxes coextensive with this claim. Certainly if constructive possession
is prevented by the true owner's occupation of part of the land de-
scribed in the deed,' the adverse occupier should be able to acquire
title to that part of the tract which he actually possesses by paying
taxes thereon. If an occupier claims only an undivided interest in
land, it has been held that payment of taxes proportionate to the
extent of his claim is sufficient under the statute."
Occasionally, the actual extent of land described in and conveyed
by a deed may exceed the number of acres specified in the deed. In
such a case one can agree that "where a grantee in a deed pays on
the number of acres called for in his conveyance, actually believing
that he is paying for the full quantity in his possession .... he should
[not] be deprived of the benefit of the statute, because it may sub-
sequently be ascertained that his tract is somewhat larger than he
believed it to be.""7 One may doubt, however, whether an occupant
should have the benefit of the statute if he learns early in the five-
year period that his deed covers seventy-three acres instead of fifty-
two acres and thereafter continues to pay taxes only on the lesser
acreage.
Nothing in the statute declares that the delinquent payment of
taxes will not satisfy the statutory requirement, and several decisions
so held early in this century.9 But it now is established that an occu-
pier must pay the taxes accruing on the land during the five-year
period before they become delinquent; failure to do so in any in-
stance stops the running of the five-year statute and nullifies all
efforts made by the occupier to comply therewith, so that he must
"Kelly v. Medlin, 26 Tex. 48 (1861); Starr v. Dunbar, 69 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) error ref.; Dowdell v. McCardell, 193 S.W. 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). In
Hoencke v. Lomax, 102 Tex. 487, 119 S.W. 842 (1909), payment of taxes on an unde-
fined part of the land claimed was held insufficient.
" See paragraph accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
"Club Land & Cattle Co. v. Wall, 99 Tex. 591, 92 S.W. 984 (1906); Dowdell v. Mc-
Cardell, 193 S.W. 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
" Henning v. Wren, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 538, 547, 75 S.W. 905, 910 (1903) error ref.
" Starkey v. McNay, 103 S.W.2d 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
9 Settegast v. Floyd, 214 S.W. 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Hirsch v. Patton, 49 Tex.
Civ. App. 499, 108 S.W. 1015 (1908); Capps v. Deegan, 50 S.W. 151 (Tex. Civ. App.




start all over again to satisfy its requirements.0 ° In the leading case
on the point, the supreme court said:
The Legislature's conclusion is . . . evident that the owner should
not be deprived of his land by reason of his failure to sue for only
half of ten years, unless he has been chargeable with notice of the
adverse claim, not only through peaceable and adverse possession, but
through a deed or deeds duly registered, and also through the payment
of taxes.
By payment of taxes, as by registration of deed, does the possessor
give notice, in a public office and in an unequivocal manner, of not
only a claim of right but of the extent of that claim. There is nothing
open to inspection in a public office to give an owner notice of the
number of acres claimed by a naked possessor out of a tract of larger
acreage than that in his actual possession. The number of acres is de-
clared and shown in the office of the tax collector and in the office of
the county clerk, when taxes are paid and when a deed, within the
meaning of the five-year statute, is recorded. The fact that the deed
records may furnish the more satisfactory notice does not prevent the
tax payments from also furnishing notice. The statute requiring notice
through both channels, notice through one, even though the better,
cannot suffice.
Regular and unbroken tax payments, moreover, have a peculiar and
distinct value in negativing an abandonment of the possessor's claim.
As certainly as the payment of taxes implies the assertion of a claim
of right, in an open and public way, which may reach the owner, so
the discontinuance of tax payments signifies the abandonment of such
claim.1"'
The cases demonstrate that the statute begins to run when the
conditions of proper registration of a deed and adverse possession
coexist... and does not cease to run thereafter if taxes are paid before
they become delinquent. In other words, the running of the statute
is postponed if and when the third condition of timely payment of
taxes fails to coexist with the other two conditions. Of course, the
taxes must be paid before becoming delinquent during five successive
years.' The fact that taxes were delinquent before or after the five-
year period does not prejudice the occupier under the statute. "
"°°Baker v. Fogle, 110 Tex. 301, 217 S.W. 141 (1919), modified on reh., 110 Tex.
301, 219 S.W. 450 (1920); Houston Oil Co. v. Jordan, 231 S.W. 320 (Tex. Comm. App.
1921); Jacobs v. Chandler, 248 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Churchman v. Rumsey,
166 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; Glasscock v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
113 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.; Bryson v. Ferrill, 25 S.W.2d 1001
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Brownfield v. Brabson, 231 S.W. 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
.o. Baker v. Fogle, 110 Tex. 301, 306-07, 217 S.W. 141, 142-43 (1919), modified on
reh., 110 Tex. 301, 219 S.W. 450 (1920).
S02See t xt accompanying note 65 supra.
.. Cases cited note 100 supra; Murphey v. Welder, 58 Tex. 235 (1883); Gramm v.
Coffield, 116 S.W.2d 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
'" Hufstedler v. Barnett, 182 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.;
Halbert v. Brown, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 335, 31 S.W. 535 (1895) error ref.
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The burden of proof concerning payment of taxes (and the other
elements of the five-year statute) is on the occupier.' Proof of pay-
ment of taxes before they became delinquent can be made by re-
ceipts, by official records, and by direct and circumstantial evidence.'
But a tax collector's certificate that no taxes are due is not of itself
sufficient proof of payment before the taxes became delinquent. 7
The reasons stated by the Texas Supreme Court for requiring that
taxes be paid before delinquent are entirely convincing. An occupier
hardly could be allowed to wait to see whether his claim were chal-
lenged during a five-year period before paying the accumulated taxes
for that entire period. A requirement in terms of delinquency of
taxes is more practical than, for example, one establishing annual
periods within which the taxes must be paid. Notice of an adverse
claim is given when taxes are paid, and the occupier should not be
permitted to postpone this notice for an indefinite time.
V. CONCLUSION
The five-year statute under discussion has a period one-half that
of the general statute of limitation"0 8 in Texas. The ten-year general
statute allows acquisition of ownership through peaceable and adverse
possession, and no other requirement is imposed. The five-year statute
under discussion operates over a relatively short period and, in addi-
tion to the requirement of peaceable and adverse possession, requires
a claim under a deed or deeds duly registered and the payment of
taxes. It is undoubtedly in accordance with legislative intent that
the courts have insisted upon full satisfaction of these additional
requirements.
The decisions concerning defects in recording seem highly tech-
nical."0 9 If a deed or deeds are accepted for registration and the
grantee or grantees enter thereunder, the notice to the "true" owner
and to the world seems unaffected if the grantor's name was tran-
scribed incorrectly, a notarial seal was left off, or phrases in the
certificate were omitted. Nevertheless, the statute calls for "duly
registered" deeds, and the courts have been on firm ground in ad-
hering to the legislative language. Among the technical defects that
105Ammerman v. Bourland, 230 S.W. 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Trinity County
Lumber Co., 4 Tex. Civ. App. 671, 23 S.W. 720, modified on other grounds, 23 S.W. 1015
(Tex. Civ. App. 1893) error ref.
"°Dutton v. Thompson, 85 Tex. 115, 19 S.W. 1026 (1892); Seemuller v. Thornton,
77 Tex. 156, 13 S.W. 846 (1890); Holasek v. Janek, 244 S.W. 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
'
0
°Acklin v. Paschal, 48 Tex. 147 (1877).
"0'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5510 (1958).
109See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
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prevent due registration, it is not easy to distinguish between those
which are material and those which are immaterial in the operation
of the five-year statute. One can understand the judicial tendency
to resolve the question by requiring an occupier attempting to gain
title in five-years to accomplish everything that is meant by "due
registration."
The course of decisions concerning payment of taxes has been
wholly satisfactory. The requirement that taxes must be paid before
becoming delinquent11 accords with common sense and insures that
notice from the payments will come at regular intervals while the
five-year period is running. The payment of taxes has a special virtue
because it defines the occupier's claim and informs the world thereof.
The requirement should not be weakened, and the decisions show no
tendency in this direction.
The tests imposed for determining whether an instrument serves as
a deed under the five-year statute have been drawn from general rules
governing conveyancing. The distinction between deeds valid or
void on their face... is a workable one. In some cases one may question
whether, from the standpoint of notice, the insistence on a sufficient
description is necessary in view of the occupation of the land by the
claimant."" Frequently, however, the claimant does not occupy all
the land which he believes his deed describes. The statute requires a
registered deed, which means that notice of what is claimed should
be given to the world. The burden properly is placed on the occupier
to ensure that his deed or deeds are sufficiently certain to indicate
the bounds of the land claimed.
The cases dealing with forged instruments .. have taken a turn
which needs correcting. As the decisions now stand, occupier A who
claims land under a single deed executed by a stranger to the title
can acquire ownership after five years, but occupier B who claims
under a similar deed which is in a chain of title leading to a forged
deed (or to a deed executed under a forged power of attorney) of
twenty-five years ago cannot acquire ownership under the five-year
statute. This amounts to unequal treatment between occupiers A and
B. No good reason exists for visiting such a drastic consequence on
an occupier who otherwise fully satisfies the requirements of the
statute with a genuine deed or deeds during five years of peaceable
and adverse possession. It is hoped that the decisions which make this
See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
"' See text accompanying and following note 36 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
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distinction will be overruled. In the alternative it is suggested that
the statute be amended to substitute for the last two sentences the
following:
The benefits of this article shall not extend to one who deraigns title
through a forged deed (or deed executed under a forged power of
attorney) executed during the five years of peaceable and adverse
possession relied upon to establish limitation title.
The five-year statute of limitation has been a worthy and desirable
part of the system of limitations of actions for the recovery of land
in Texas. On the whole its operation is clear and is satisfactorily
understood. It is expected that the statute will continue to have an
important role in the adjudication of titles in the future.
